At IEEE GLOBECOM 2008, a lightweight cipher based on a Multiple Recursive Generator (MRG) was proposed for use in resource limited environment such as sensor nodes and RFID tags. This paper proposes two efficient attacks on this MRG cipher. A distinguishing attack is firstly introduced to identify the use of an MRG cipher that has a modulus suggested by its designers. It requires 2 18 words of ciphertext and the most significant bit of each corresponding plaintext word. Then an efficient known plaintext attack is proposed to construct the cipher's current state and generate subkeys used for all subsequent encryption. The known plaintext attack, when targeted at the MRG ciphers optimized for efficiency, only requires 2k words of known plaintext and trivial computation where k is the MRG order. Even the ciphers based on complicated and inefficient MRGs can be attacked with low complexity, e.g., in the magnitude of 2 12 words of known plaintext for all MRG ciphers with order 47, regardless of which MRG modulus is used. These two attacks indicate that the examined MRG cipher structure is seriously flawed.
Introduction
A Multiple Recursive Generator (MRG) usually generates a sequence of numbers with a very long period. A block cipher based on MRG was proposed at IEEE GLOBECOM 2008 [9] , which uses initial MRG seeds as cipher key and generates a sequence to be used for encrypting 32-bit plaintext each time. The cipher designers suggest the use of m = 2 31 − 1 as MRG modulus and select a particular case with order k = 47 for performance analysis [9] . The MRG cipher is claimed to be very useful and secure enough for resource limited environment such as sensor nodes and RFID tags.
In cryptanalysis, a distinguishing attack aims to identify the use of a specific cipher. Usually it examines the statistical patterns in plaintext and/or ciphertext in order to tell its difference from a random mapping. Although not intending to discover a key, a successful distinguishing attack indicates existence of security weakness in a cipher. The distinguish attack in Section 3 works with 2
18 ciphertext words and the Most Significant Bits (MSBs) of corresponding plaintext words. These ciphertext words do not have to be encrypted with the same key or computed sequentially. In many applications, a plaintext word's MSB is much easier to obtain or guess than the whole 32 bit content. For example, if the plaintext is English language text in ASCII, all the MSBs will be zero. The distinguishing attack will still be applicable, with reduced efficiency, if there is any significant bias in these MSBs.
A known plaintext attack assumes that attackers can collect certain amount of plaintext and its corresponding ciphertext encrypted using an unknown key. This attack typically aims to deduce the cipher key with less complexity than a brute force attack. For example, linear cryptanalysis in [8] successfully breaks block cipher DES with 2 47 known plaintexts while a brute force attack takes 2 56 key searches. Known plaintext can be obtained through eavesdropping a communication channel and certain inferencing. For example, X.509 digital certificates [1] are supposed to be public information and widely used in IKE [6] and TLS [3] . If a cipher is used by IKE or provides lower layer protection for TLS (e.g., data link layer protection with EAP-TLS [11] as payload), the encrypted words corresponding to these certificates can be collected. Our known plaintext attack on those efficient MRG ciphers actually requires known plaintext less than a regular X.509 certificate.
In this paper, we firstly propose a distinguishing attack to reliably distinguish an MRG cipher using modulus 2 31 −1 [9] from encrypting with random sequence. It requires 2 18 words of ciphertext and each corresponding plaintext word's MSB. Then a known plaintext attack is proposed on a generic MRG cipher, regardless of which modulus is used. When the MRG is optimized for efficiency, the attack requires only 2k words of sequential plaintext and its corresponding ciphertext, where k is the order of MRG used for this cipher (e.g., k = 47 in the cipher illustrated in [9] ). With 48k decryption operations, the encryption system's state can be restored, the key is recovered, and all subsequent ciphertext can be decrypted. By comparison, a brute force attack needs 2 32k attempts to search k initial MRG seeds, 32 bits each. The attack also works on MRG ciphers with maximum number of distinct coefficients. Any MRG cipher with a practical order (k ≤ 47) can be attacked successfully, with usually no more than 2 12 words of known plaintext and trivial computation.
Summary of the MRG Cipher
As Figure 1 illustrates, the MRG cipher has 4 steps for encryption as the following.
• Step 1: pseudorandom number generation. An MRG is used to generate a sequence of numbers Figure 1 : MRG Based Cipher [9] Although not clearly specified, the MRG designers suggest the use of modulus 2 31 − 1 for efficiency improvement in cipher description [9] 1 : because m = 2 31 − 1 and 
A Distinguishing Attack
When the MRG cipher uses a modulus of 31 bits (i.e., m = 2 31 − 1) as suggested in [9] , each subkey X i (= Denote P c (i) as the probability that the i-th bit in a byte of C has a carry bit out. Since
, the i-th bit location has carry out when p i ||x i ||carry-bit i−1 ="011", "101" or when p i ||x i ="11". Thus,
After byte-wise modulo addition, C's MSB changes from p 31 with probability P c (6) = . So c 31 = p 31 with probability 1 − P c (6) = . The attack is based on the probability bias p b of C's MSB. Given a random sequence used for encrypting plaintext in a perfect manner, the MSBs of a ciphertext word's 4 bytes all match the corresponding plaintext word's MSB with probability 1/16. Encrypted using this MRG cipher, a ciphertext word has its 4 bytes' MSBs identical to the MSB of its plaintext word, with probability (1/8) * (1/2 + p b ). The following theorem in [7] is used to estimate the number of sufficient samples to distinguish the MRG cipher:
Theorem 1 (See detailed proof in [7]) Let M, N be distributions, and suppose the event e happens in M with probability p and in N with probability p(1+q). Then for small p and q, O(1/pq
2 ) samples suffice to distinguish M from N with a constant probability of success.
In our case, the event e is that the 4 bytes in ciphertext have their MSBs match the MSB of corresponding plaintext word. According to the above theorem:
Thus, a distinguishing attack works on the MRG with samples in the magnitude of 2 18 . Each sample needs the MSBs of a ciphertext word's 4 bytes and the MSB of its plaintext word. These ciphertext words do not have to be encrypted with the same key or computed sequentially. A word's MSB is often fixed when its content follows certain format (e.g., English language text in ASCII) or varies slightly (e.g., air pressure data collected by a wireless sensor). Thus, it is not hard to collect enough ciphertext and MSBs of plaintext for this attack.
We simulate this attack for 1000 times on 2 18 . Denote M e and N e as random variables of event e in distributions using random source for encryption and using MRG cipher for encryption, respectively. We use a cryptographic random number generator, CryptGenRandom(.) provided by Microsoft CryptoAPI, to emulate a random source. With 2 18 samples, the mean and standard deviation are 16382 and 121.68 for M e ; 16515 and 124.95 for N e . These results are close to their theoretic values from binomial distribution with t samples: To make the difference more significant, we run the test with 2 22 samples. As illustrated in Figure 3 , with 16 times more samples, we can distinguish an MRG cipher with more confidence.
A Known Plaintext Attack
The MRG cipher takes k seeds as its cipher key. An exhaustive key search requires 2 32k attempts with at least k words of known plaintext and ciphertext.
An improved attack is to exhaustively search subkeys {X i } sufficient to derive the current MRG state, which requires 2 32 k encryption (or decryption) operations and at least k words of known plaintext and ciphertext. The attack can be accelerated by looking up a dictionary indexed by 32-bit plaintext and its ciphertext. As a result, k table lookups are needed with a dictionary containing 2 64 words. A chosen plaintext attack can reduce dictionary size to 2 32 words. However, as discussed later, these attacks may lead to multiple candidates for This section illustrates an attack much more efficient than these generic attacks.
General Description
The cipher can be divided into two phases: (I) pseudorandom sequence generation using an MRG; (II) encryption of each 32-bit word using one MRG output word X i (i ≥ k) as subkey. We start with subkey X k guessing. When we have candidates for k +1 sequential subkeys, we can use the following equation to remove wrong candidates through further subkey deducing.
Although the coefficients for multiplication are not specified clearly, performance analysis in [9] indicates that any MRG with order larger than 47 is not practical (even k = 47 is much larger than current secure designs). We first attack the cipher in phase (II) and allow only a small number of candidates to survive from each subkey's deducing. Then we analyze the complexity to reduce spurious subkeys in phase (I) with different MRG coefficients. 
Deducing Subkey
The right candidate X k certainly matches its permutation. In total, the expected number of X s k to survive permutation verification is:
With each word of known plaintext and ciphertext, we reduce its subkey X k candidates from 2 32 to a variable up to 24, with expectation E sv . The pseudo code in Figure 4 deduces subkey X k after examining 24 possible permutations. This procedure can be repeated for sequential words of known plaintext and ciphertext, to deduce subkey candidates for X i (i > k).
As the critical step of this attack, the process of subkey deducing has been implemented. All coefficients for MRG are not clearly specified in [9] . Thus, we assume that MRG outputs are as good as those from a cryptographic random number generator. In each subkey deducing process, the plaintext word and subkey X k are simulated with CryptGenRandom(.) provided by Microsoft CryptoAPI.
We first assume that m is a prime close to 2 32 such that the condition (X k < MRG-modulus) cannot remove any spurious subkey. In total, there are 2 32 m possible combinations of plaintext and subkey. It is costly to exhaustively study their statistics of subkey deducing behaviors. As shown in Table 1 3}, {2, 0, 3, 1}, {2, 1, 0, 3}, {2, 1, 3, 0},  {2, 3, 0, 1}, {2, 3, 1, 0}, {3, 0, 1, 2}, {3, 0, 2, 1} , . We apply this condition check to the previous tests, assuming that m = 2 31 − 1. The mean of surviving subkey count decreases to 1.727 and the standard deviation is 1.083 during the 2 32 subkey deducing tests. Thus, the attack removes spurious subkeys more effectively, when targeted at those efficient MRGs with modulus m = 2 31 − 1.
Removing Spurious Subkeys
For each key between X k and X 2k−1 inclusively, we can remove spurious subkey combination by verifying: n , where n is the number of nonzero coefficients in α 1 , . . . , α k .
The value of n directly determines the efficiency of MRG, because n multiplications normally are needed to generate one subkey (unless many coefficients are identical).
Attack on MRG Ciphers Optimized for Efficiency
The MRG cipher proposed in [9] may use an efficient MRG with 2 to 4 nonzero coefficients in (α 1 , . . . , α k ), as analyzed in [2] . For example, an MRG may consist of 2 nonzero coefficients for multiplication:
This type of MRG has better performance than those with more nonzero coefficients. It is trivial to verify that (E sv ) 2 << 2 32 /E sv . For each subkey between X k and X 3k−1 inclusively, spurious subkeys can be removed by verifying:
Once subkeys X k to X 2k−1 are uniquely identified, we obtain sufficient information of MRG's current state. All subsequent subkeys can be easily derived from MRG computation.
Ciphers with those MRGs consisting of 3 or 4 nonzero coefficients for multiplication can be attacked in a similar way because (E sv )
Attack on Complicated MRG Ciphers
The most complicated MRGs are perhaps those having maximum number of distinct nonzero values for all coefficients α 1 , . . . , α k . We assume that its m is close to 2 32 . Such an MRG is extremely inefficient but helpful to estimate the upper bound of the attack's complexity for all MRG ciphers.
Give k sequential subkeys to deduce, the number of events to uniquely identify a subkey is a random variable Y in a binomial distribution: Y ∼ B(k, p), where p is the probability that all 23 spurious subkey maps to wrong permutations. Thus, p = ( Table 1 . Y is not less than a threshold y with probability: . For example, when y = 26, 2 −32 (E sv ) k−y+1 = 0.006908, indicating that spurious subkeys can be reliably removed; P r(Y ≥ y) = 0.01003, indicating the number of samples needed to uniquely identify 26 subkeys among 47 sequential subkeys is in the magnitude of 1/P r(Y ≥ y) = 99.7. Thus, the required known plaintext is in the magnitude of k/P r(Y ≥ y) = 4686 ≈ 2 12 words. 
Cipher Performance
Although called block cipher, the MRG cipher works more similarly to a word oriented stream cipher. The MRG cipher is designed for use cases in a resource limited environment. However, even an efficient MRG with two identical nonzero coefficients (thus extremely insecure) takes one 32-bit multiplication and one modulo operation. These two operations are not efficient in either hardware or software. The MRG takes k variables (e.g., 188 bytes when k = 47) in memory.
By comparison, cipher RC4 only takes 258 bytes in memory for keystream generation. Many word oriented stream ciphers (e.g., SNOW [4] and SOBER [5] families of ciphers) take less memory, require no multiplication or modulus operations, and demonstrate good performance over various platforms. For example, a software implementation of SNOW 2.0 only takes 6.75 cycles/byte [10] .
Conclusion
Our attacks work on the MRG cipher with manageably low space and time complexity. Therefore, the cipher structure proposed in [9] is seriously flawed. It should not be used for cryptographic applications even in resource restricted systems.
